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Resumen
Este artículo muestra las diferentes posiciones sobre el debate entre el derecho y la 
economía, sobre todo, la competencia, legitimidad y conveniencia de la intervención 
de los tribunales constitucionales en la elaboración de las políticas económicas. Para 
hacerlo, primero, vamos a presentar el marco general de la evolución del derecho 
constitucional, es decir, la creciente importancia y el poder de los tribunales cons-
titucionales en las sociedades democráticas contemporáneas. En segundo lugar, nos 
centraremos en el caso colombiano, por esa razón, inicialmente, vamos a explicar 
por qué el caso colombiano es relevante para nuestra investigación, en cuarto lugar 
expondremos los antecedentes del derecho constitucional colombiano, en tercer 
lugar, vamos a presentar los principales efectos de las decisiones del Tribunal Cons-
titucional de Colombia en la economía colombiana, así como las críticas sobre la 
actividad de la Corte Constitucional, en quinto lugar, haremos hincapié en el papel 
de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia en la definición de las políticas de salud. 
En sexto lugar, vamos a resumir los principales argumentos a favor y en contra de 
la intervención de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia en la elaboración de las 
políticas económicas en general, y la política de salud en Colombia en particular. 
Por último, vamos a exponer algunas conclusiones finales.
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Abstract
This article shows the different positions about the debate between law and eco-
nomy, especially, the competence, legitimacy and convenience of constitutional 
courts intervention in the making of economic policies.   To do it, first at all, we 
will to present the general context of the evolution of constitutional law, that is to 
say, the growing importance and power of constitutional courts in the contemporary 
democratic societies. Secondly, we will focus in Colombian case, for that reason, 
first, we will to explain why the Colombian case is relevant for our research, se-
cond, we will to set out the Colombian constitutional law background, third, we 
will to present the main effects of the Colombian Constitutional Court decisions in 
the Colombian economy as well as the criticism about the Constitutional Court’s 
activity, fourth, we will to emphasize in the role of Colombian Constitutional Court 
in defining health policy. Thirdly, we will to summarize the main arguments for 
and against the intervention of Colombian Constitutional Court in the making of 
economic policies in general, and the Colombian health policy in particular. Finally, 
we will expose some final conclusions. 
Keywords 
Constitutional law, Colombian Constitutional Court, economic policies, judicial 
activism. 
introduction:  hypothesis and methodology
This article pretends to bring a possible answer to this question: It is advisable 
that Constitutional Courts interfere in the making of Economic Policy? This is a 
currently issue that many countries, especially developing countries, have been 
facing.  The debate about this issue has risen in the last decades because of the new 
role of constitutional courts in the contemporary societies. 
Our hypothesis is that there is a relationship between judicial activism and 
economic growth; an unlimited judicial activism can be produce economic di-
sequilibrium   as well as a complex situation of protection of human rights. It 
is happen because judges do not pay attention about economic consequences of 
their decisions.
In our research we used a methodology that combines a compilation of background 
information as well as comparative method. First at all, we collected all the papers 
(books, magazines, newspapers) about our research problem, then, we selected the 
most relevant information. Secondly, we looked for representative cases into the 
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Colombian Constitutional Court jurisprudence and selected four representative cases 
(Case of mortgage debtors (case of UPAC), Case of forcedly displaced population, 
Case of prisoners and the case of the right to health).
Thirdly, we looked at some countries that have faced the same debates about the 
Constitutional Courts interference in the Economic Policy Making. Finally, after 
this comparative law exercise, we analyzed the information and suggest an answer 
for our research question.
1. the power of Constitutional Courts 
Constitutional Court annulling reform package would ruin economy. It was a 
headline in a Turkish newspaper that represents the importance of Constitutional 
Courts in a contemporary society. Last month one of the most important news in 
Turkey was the anxiously waiting for the Constitutional Court’s ruling about a reform 
package proposed by Turkish government (Baysal & Kaya, 2010).
The experts had predicted that if the Constitutional Court annuls one or more 
articles of the package, this would cause great financial damage. For instance, the 
Court’s decision can be scare foreign investors and produce an economic crisis. 
That is why, businessman, investors and citizens centered their attention on the 
Justices of the Turkish Constitutional Court. Some Turkish could not understand 
why the Constitutional Court can be change the economic future of their country.
Just like Turkish, citizens of many countries have been asking the same questions 
about the competence, legitimacy and convenience of constitutional courts in-
tervention in the making of economic policies. The fact is that indeed, in the last 
decades has developed a tendency to give more power to courts in order to control 
the other branches: the legislative and executive.  
This tendency has been developing in concordance with other controversial tendency: 
the theory of social rights and their justiciability.  That is why; democratic countries have 
been incorporating in their constitutions bill of rights that include social, economical 
and cultural rights (also known as second and third generation rights). To enforce this 
kind of rights, constitutions provide to citizens several sorts of legal actions.
In this context, constitutional courts have been empowered by constitutions. What 
this means is that constitutional courts have more powers than before to interfere in 
economic, social and politics issues.  This has stimulated a lot of crashes between 
the branches, especially between judicial and legislative branches. This situation 
produced a new way to see the classical principle of separation of powers. Accor-
ding to Cooter (2002): 
A conventional formula distinguishes among the legislative, executive 
and judicial branches of government. By convention, law should be 
made by the legislature, enforced by the executive, and interpreted by the 
courts. Reality is much more complicated than this simple formula. Each 
of three branches of government performs all three activities, although 
not to an equal extent (p.173).
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There is a vigorously debate about the implications of the expansion on judicial 
power and the effects of this power, particularly in countries where the democracy 
has not been totally consolidated. 
Judicial optimists draw on the experience of polities that a successful 
transition to democracy, such as South Africa and Germany, to argue 
that judicial review has an important democratic pay-off by strengthe-
ning constitutions. Judicial pessimists, on the other hand, draw on the 
experience of older, consolidated democracies, such as United States, 
to argue that empowering courts weakens citizen’s attachment to cons-
titutions and undermines the ability of legislatures to solve pressing 
problems (Schor, 2008, p. 3).
In conclusion, unlike before, the constitutional court has a relevant role in a de-
mocratic society. Thus, besides the traditional role of interpreting law the courts 
have the power to interference in the making of public policies. The constitutional 
courts can interference in the making of public policies by annulling laws as well 
as by interpreting those in a specific way in order to enforce social rights. 
2. the Colombian case: enforcing rights by judicial activism 
In the first section of this paper, we presented the general context of the evolution 
of constitutional law, that is to say, the new roles of constitutional court in a demo-
cratic society. Now, in this section we will present the impact of these tendencies in 
the Colombian legal system. First, it is important to say why Colombian as well as 
countries in  process to be a consolidated democracy, can be  interesting objects of 
study, then, we will to set out the Colombian constitutional law background, third, 
we will to present the main effects of the Colombian Constitutional Court decisions 
in the Colombian economy as well as the criticism about the Constitutional Court’s 
activity, finally, we will to emphasize in the role of Colombian Constitutional Court 
in defining health policy
2.1 Relevance of legal debates from countries that are on the way 
to the consolidation of the democracy
Sometimes scholars refuse to study the experience of the developing world because 
there is a belief that new democracies or countries in process to be a democratic 
society should to copy the best practices of consolidated democracies, such as 
United States of America or Germany (Schor, 2008).   The problem of this point of 
view is that important theories as well as legal and political debates about the way 
towards a consolidated democracy are ignored, even by some scholars from coun-
tries in process to be a strong democratic society, who just try to imitated foreign 
ideas without a critical insertion process. 
It is obvious that there are centers of knowledge that have a great influence in the 
legal theory, however, on the way from these centers to reception sites, sometimes 
legal theories can change, their meaning can be modified by scholars from reception 
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sites. These transmutations of ideas should not be dismissed only because there are 
not totally original ideas. The relationship between “production sites” of judicial 
theory and “reception sites” is developed at greater length by the professor Diego 
López (2008).
 In the Colombian case, the 1991 Constitution was the product of a great consti-
tutional experimentation, this Constitution created a Welfare State, changed the 
power structure, incorporated a wide bill of rights composed of civil and political 
rights, as well as social, economic, cultural, and collective rights, created a new and 
powerful constitutional watch guard: The Colombian Constitution Court, and last 
but not least, the Constitution enjoins the State to protect and fulfill the principles 
and rights in the bill of rights (Article 2 Colombian Constitution)  The Colombian 
case is thus worth studying. 
2.2 Colombian Constitutional context 
In this section we will expose briefly the main aspects of Colombian constitutional 
context, to start, we will talk about the powers of the Colombian Constitutional 
Court, then, we will show some possible causes of Court activism. 
The 1991 Constitution created two constitutional citizen actions which determine 
the Constitutional Court’s forms of jurisdiction: abstract and concrete control of 
constitutionality.  The fist one is the public action of unconstitutionality by virtue 
of which any citizen can demand the Court that a law or decree be declared un-
constitutional, without him or her being a lawyer or having any particular interest 
in the issue, as opposed to other legal systems that require either or both of these 
conditions.  
The tutela action is the other constitutional action contained in the 1991 Colombian 
Constitution, by virtue of which any person may directly request any judge to pro-
tect his or her fundamental rights when they are being violated by a state agent or 
an individual which the person is subordinated, and when there is no other legal 
action that can be used to prevent the right violation from continuing. 
As with the public action of unconstitutionality, citizens do not need to be a lawyer 
to file a tutela action. Judges are obliged to give priority to tutela actions, which 
are thus decided within ten days. 
2.3 Judicial activism
The next point is the sources or causes of Constitutional Court activism. There is 
not a consensus about it; however, we propose to classify the possible sources of 
judicial activism in Colombia in four kinds: legal, ideological, factual and political 
sources, in other words: (i) constitutional competences of Colombia Constitutio-
nal Court as well as open texture of the constitution; (ii) new ideology about the 
judicial role; (iii) usurpation of competences by Constitutional Court and; (iv) 
inefficiency of the legislative and executive as well as the political parties and 
social movements. 
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The 1991 Constitution gives to Court institutional and legal elements in order to enforce-
ment the values, principles and right contained in the Constitution, such a  tutela action 
and the public action of unconstitutionality, which as we saw earlier, some academics 
think that these new powers can be explain the judicial activism, nevertheless, the 
Constitutional Court “has interpreted these competences in a generous way” (Uprim-
ny, 2006, p. 4), for example, the Court interpreted that its competence to decide upon 
the constitutionality of a law includes not only its power to either maintain it in the 
legal order by declaring its constitutionality or annul it but also its power to declare it 
conditionally constitutional, by maintaining it in the legal order and offering the only 
constitutional interpretation the text can be given (Case  C-112/00). 
For this way, the Court has been modified some laws. It has been possible because 
of the open texture of the constitution allows judges to interpreter the constitution 
in an unlimited way (Carrasquilla, 2001, p.22).
On the other hand, some academics think that the source of the judicial activism 
is not the constitutional text. They argue that we should to look at the new parti-
cular set of ideas about the judicial role. That is why, “activism is a function of the 
ideas held by judges about their institutional role” (Nuñes, 2009, p. 3). The judges 
believe that they have a main role in a democratic society; they think that should 
to impulse the social change, for example, protecting social rights.  
The new Constitution encourages the judges to interpret the law in a special way. 
When judges are applying a law in a specific case, they must to remember the values 
and principles of the Welfare State, if the solution given by the law is “unfair”, the 
judges can refuse to apply this law and instead, to apply directly the constitutional 
values, principles and fundamental right in order to solve the case “fairly”.    
As opposed to this position, there are a group of Colombian academics who think that 
the source of the judicial activism is the wrong interpretation of the Constitution by 
the Constitutional Court. They argue that the creation of the theory about the “new 
law” or “anti-formalism” is just an invention that allows dangerous judicial discre-
tion.  Without a doubt, when the Justices of the Constitutional Court modify the main 
sense of a law by interpretation, they are creating law, as a matter of fact, the court 
has not interpreted reasonably the law, the Court has been ignore the law (Tamayo, 
2010, p.101) something inadmissible in a Roman-Germany legal system where the 
positive law (writing into a collection codified) is the main source to decide cases.   
Finally, some scholars consider that the problem is the inefficiency of the legislative 
and executive as well as the political parties and social movements, according to 
Uprimny (2006b):
This activism has also been stimulated by two structural political fac-
tors: the crisis in political representation and the weakness of social 
movements and opposition parties in Colombia. Because of Colombia 
generalized disenchantment with politics, certain social groups have 
demanded solutions from constitutional jurisdiction to problems that 
should be debated and overcome by means of democratic process in the 
first place” (p. 6).
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2.4 Controversial decisions and their economic consequences 
In this section we will analyze three controversial cases that generated strong 
criticism against the Colombian Constitutional Court because of their economic 
consequences. These cases are: (i) the case of mortgage debtors (case of UPAC); (ii) 
the case of forcedly displaced population; (iii) the case of prisoners.
In the next section of this article we will focus in another interesting case: the case 
of the right to health. All these decisions have implied significant budgetary costs. 
2.4.1 The case of mortgage debtors
There was a financial system called UPAC (Unity of constant acquisitive power), 
in 1997 Colombia went into a deep recession that sent into crisis a lot of debtors, 
approximately 800.000 debtors who had taken loans to buy their homes with the 
UPAC system. In 1999, about 200.000 debtors and their families were on the verge 
of losing their homes.
They asked to the government for a reform of the financial system, even some of 
them implemented civil disobedience strategies in order to refuse to continue pa-
ying their mortgages or to hand their homes over the banks. However, they never 
received an answer from the Congress or the President. 
Finally, debtors decided to launch constitutionality actions against the norms that 
regulated the UPAC system, the public action of unconstitutionality and the tute-
la action, mentioned above. In 1999, the Constitutional Court pronounced three 
decisions on the matter (Cases: C-383/99 C-700/99 and C-747/99) which protected 
and relieved mortgage debtors. 
In these decisions the Constitutional Court ordered to tying the UPAC system to 
inflation, forbidding the addition of owed interests to capital debt and the recalcu-
lation of mortgages. Furthermore,  the Constitutional Court,  ordered to Congress 
to pass a new law on housing financing that allows to Colombians enjoy their 
fundamental rights to have a home and live with dignity. 
These decisions were severely criticized by economist as well as politics and 
lawyers. The criticisms can be classify in two groups: first, criticisms that attack the 
competence of the Constitutional Court to make this kind of decisions, and second, 
criticisms that attack the Court decisions because of their economic consequences. 
The main criticism was the violation of the principle of separation of powers. Some 
scholars argued that the Constitutional Court had encroached upon the powers of 
Congress (Nuñez, 2005, p. 32). These scholars think that these kinds of issues should 
to be debated by the Congress and Government because they are legitimated to make 
decisions about country’s economic policy because that is what they were elected 
for. On the contrary, the justices of the Constitutional Court are not legitimated to 
interference in the making of economic policies (Kalmanovitz, 2003). 
On the other hand, the Court decision was also criticized because of its economic 
consequences. Economist argued that the addition of owed interests to capital debt 
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allow that people who have low ingress get a loan with low periodical payment 
fees, therefore, forbidding the addition of owed interests to capital debt and the 
recalculation of mortgages restricted the access of poor people to home loans (Cla-
vijo, 2001, pp. 43-49).
2.4.2 The case of forcedly displaced population
The Colombian armed conflict has generated an enormous number of forcedly 
displaced populations who are forced to leave their homes and to migrate to cities 
and urban centers where no sources of subsistence have. This situation configures 
a truly humanitarian tragedy.
In 2004, many forcedly displaced persons started filing tutela actions, they asked to 
government for protection of their fundamental rights, especially the right to human 
dignity and housing. In this year, the Constitutional Court decided to declare the 
existence of an “unconstitutional state of things”; this mean that the Court decla-
red that government has been systematically violating forcedly displaced persons 
rights (Case T-025/04).
In this historic decision, the Court ordered the national authorities to reformulated 
and clarify the strategies in order to attend the basis needs of forcedly displaced 
population. 
This decision generated the disapproval of many scholars who criticized the Court 
because of its use of the concrete control of constitutionality to give general orders 
to national authorities. 
In fact, as we saw earlier, in Colombian legal system there are two kinds of cons-
titutional controls: the abstract control (public action of unconstitutionality) and 
the concrete control (tutela action). The public action of unconstitutionality has 
erga omnes effects, that is, the judge decision is mandatory to everybody. In these 
cases, the Court has to decide if a law is constitutional or not. 
As opposed to abstract control, the tutela action has an inter partes effects, that 
is, the judge only can give concrete orders to persons who are party in the judicial 
process. In this case, forcedly displaced persons filed tutela actions, (concrete 
control); however, Constitutional Court gave general orders to national authorities. 
2.4.3 The case of prisoners
In this case several prisoners filed tutela actions against the state’s penitentiary 
authorities. The prisoner was claiming that their constitutional rights to life, dignity 
and health were being violated by the state as a consequence of the over-crowdedness 
and precarious circumstances of the prisons they were in. 
As the case of forcedly displaced population the Constitutional Court declared the 
existence of an “unconstitutional state of things”. Consequently, the Court ordered 
to Ministry of Justice to build more prisons, modernize the already existing prisons 
and hire more security guards for them. 
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In this case as well as the case of forcedly displaced population and the case of 
mortgage debtors, the Constitutional Court conditioned the priorities and orien-
tation of the governmental strategies in these sectors. Thus, questions about the 
competence, legitimacy and convenience of Court decisions have been arising.  
2.5 Health policy and Constitutional Courts
The intervention by the constitutional courts in a wide range of issues, including 
those involving social and economic rights, such as the right to health, has genera-
ted a debate about the competence and legitimacy of the judiciary in entering areas 
which have for long been perceived as belonging property within the domain of 
the legislative and executive (Muralidhar, 2002, p. 4).
In the case of the right to health, the debate has a particularity: the relationship 
between it and the right to life. This particularity generates the inclusion of moral 
reasoning besides to legal, political and economic arguments in the debate, for that 
reason, some people who disagree with the justiciability of social and economic 
rights consider that in the case of the right of health can be convenient moderate 
degrees of justiciability. 
On the other hand, some scholars consider that in the debate about the justicia-
bility of the right to health, moral reasoning should to be out of the question. 
To illustrate this position, we will to quote a passage of a dialogue between 
William Shatner and Rush Limbaugh1 that took place on a recent episode of 
the television talk show “Raw Nerve” in the United States, we read this passa-
ge in an article wrote by  Uwe E. Reinhardt who is an economics professor at 
Princeton University. 
“Shatner: Here’s my premise, and you agree with it or not. If you have 
money, you are going to get health care. If you don’t have money, it’s 
more difficult.
Limbaugh: If you have money you’re going to get a house on the beach. 
If you don’t have money, you’re going to live in a bungalow somewhere.
Shatner: Right, but we’re talking about health care.
Limbaugh: What’s the difference?
Shatner: The difference is we’re talking about health care, not a house 
or a bungalow.
Limbaugh: “No. No. You’re assuming that there is some morally superior 
aspect to health care than there is to a house
Shatner: No, I’m not moral at all. I want to keep the subject, for the 
moment, on the health care thing.” 
1 Rush Limbaugh is a famous radio host in the United States, conservative political commentator, and an influential 
opinion leader in conservative politics and Conservatism in the United States.
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Focusing in Colombian case again, now, we will to describe in a few words the 
Colombian healthcare system as well as its problems, then, we will to present a 
landmark decision about right to health in Colombia, the Constitutional Court 
decision number T-760/08.
2.6 Colombian healthcare system (Law 100)
In 1993, the Colombian government makes a major healthcare reform inspired by 
neoliberal ideas. The Law 100 created a competitive surrogate model which used 
public and private insurers as surrogates to purchase health care for insured patients. 
This system also established a two-tier system of benefits: (i) the contributory 
regime for those formally employed, and (ii) the subsidized regime that includes 
approximately one-half of the benefits in the contributory regime. Every regime 
has a list of medicines and treatment that the patients can access (in Spanish Plan 
Obligatorio de salud – POS).
This system has been widely criticized by patients. Inefficiency and poor quality 
are the main problems of the system, for that reason, patients increasingly turned 
to the courts to secure treatments and services (Yamin & Parra, 2010, p. 2).
Between 1999 and 2005, the Colombian Human Rights Ombudsman Office cal-
culates that 328.191 tutelas actions were presented relating to the right to health; 
approximately 80% of those cases were granted. In addition, between 1999 and 
2005, approximately 89% of surgeries, 93% of the treatments and 84% of the pro-
cedures that were petitioned for using tutela action were already included in the 
contributory (Plan obligatorio de salud POS) or subsidized regimen (Plan obligatorio 
de salud del régimen subsidiado POSS).
These statistics show “a health system with little capacity for internal regulation, 
where judicial recourse has become a form of escape valve” (Yamin, 2010, p. 2).
From 2006 to 2008, the number of tutelas actions has been increasing significantly 
as this chart shows: 
Tutela’s Actions Filed 2006 - 2008
Year 2006 2007 2008 Total
Right number % number % number % number %
Health 96.229 37,6 107.238 37,8 142.957 41,5 346.424 39,2
Right to Petition 99.819 39,0 103.844 36,6 113.224 32,9 316.887 35,8
Life 86.320 33,7 91.251 32,2 88.621 25,7 266.192 30,1
Social Rights 68.033 26,6 57.594 20,3 77.268 22,4 202.895 22,9
Due Process 40.270 15,7 44.364 15,6 42.281 12,3 126.915 14,4
Source: Colombian Human Rights Ombudsman Office
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2.7 The case of the right to health: a landmark decision
The Constitutional Colombian Court has applied the conexity theory to enforce 
social right, thus, social rights can be protected through tutela action when those 
are connected with fundamental rights, for instance, the right to health in some 
cases is strongly connected with the right to life, for example, when the patient’s 
life is at risk, in this cases the right to health can be enforce by the judges. 
In 2008, the Constitutional Colombian Court handed down a landmark decision 
(Case T-760/08). In this decision, the Court ordered a restructuring of the country’s 
health care system. This decision came as the culmination of a wave of litigation 
to enforce the right to health, as we saw earlier. 
The Court ordered to unify the benefits plans (POS and POSS), first for children and 
later for adults, in the latter case progressively and taking into account financial 
sustainability, as well as the epidemiological profile of the population. The Court 
also called upon the government to adopt deliberate measures to progressively 
realize universal coverage by 2010.
In addition, the Constitutional Court ordered to National Commission for Health 
Regulation to immediately and on an annual basis comprehensively update the 
benefits included in the POS and POSS through a process that includes direct and 
effective participation of the medical community and the users of the health system. 
3. Colombian Constitutional Court in the making of economic policy 
In this section of the article, we will to summarize the main arguments for and 
against the intervention of Colombian Constitutional Court in the making of eco-
nomic policies.
First at all, the violation of the principle of separation of powers is the main argu-
ment against the intervention of Constitutional Court in the making of economic 
policies. According to this perspective, Constitutional Court does not have the 
competence to make decision about a country’s economic model; this competence 
is exclusively of the Congress in coordination with the government (Amaya, 2001). 
For that reason, whenever the Court interferes in economic issues, it violates the 
principle of separation of powers (Clavijo, 2001)
On the other hand, in spite of not having a democratic origin as the congress or the 
government, the Constitutional Court exercises an essential democratic role: the 
defense of the minorities rights (Uprimny, 2006b, p.17). That is why, in a society 
democracy is necessary an impartial judge who protect the minorities against the 
power of the majorities.  
However, some scholars think that this protective role can generate a macroeconomic 
disequilibrium that affects the economic growth, for example, the case of mortgage 
debtors (Kalmanovitz, 2003, p. 151). For that reason, the terrible economic conse-
quences can be justify the not intervention of Constitutional Court in the making 
of economic policies.  
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According to this perspective, the economic consequences should to limit the ju-
dicial activism. Radical scholars, such as, Arango (2004, p.180) consider that the 
judges must to enforce the rights, even the social and economic rights, and do not 
pay attention about the possible economic consequences of their decisions.
In the middle of these theories, some people argue that judicial activism is conve-
nience only if it respects the principle of separation of powers and the judges pay 
attention about the possible economic consequences of their decisions. For exam-
ple, justice Cepeda (2004) argue that in the last years the Constitutional Court has 
considered the economic consequences of its decisions, for that reason, the Court 
has handed down conditionally sentences. 
4. Conclusions
Democracy, economic equality and economic growth are important objectives in 
contemporary societies; however, sometimes it can be difficult to satisfy at the same 
time these objectives, especially, in developing countries. 
With the constitutionalization of social rights, the judges face difficult dilemmas 
when they are deciding cases, especially cases of social and economic rights, such 
as the right to health. For one side, the judges have the pressure of the person who 
asks for protection to his fundamental rights, on the other side, judges have the 
pressure of people who are ready to accuse them to violate the principle of sepa-
ration of powers and produce macroeconomic disequilibrium.
This problematic situation was described by Frank Michelman in the following way: 
By constitutionalizing social rights, the argument often has run, you force the judi-
ciary to a hapless choice between usurpation and abdication, from which there is 
no escape without embarrassment or discredit. One way, it is said, lies the judicial 
choice to issue positive enforcement orders in a pretentious, inexpert, probably vain 
but nevertheless resented attempt to reshuffle the most basic resource-management 
priorities of the public house-hold against prevailing political will. The other way 
lies the judicial choice to debase dangerously the entire currency of rights and the 
rule of law by openly ceding to executive and parliamentary bodies an unreviewable 
privilege of indefinite postponement of a declared constitutional right (p. 22).
The Constitutional Courts activism is not an exclusive Colombian issue, there 
are a lot of countries where the debate between about the competence, legitimacy 
and convenience of constitutional courts intervention in the making of economic 
policies has took place (Mubangizi, 2006), also, there are a variety of answers for 
this issue and we should to learn about that.    
As a final conclusion, we believe that judicial activism is advisable only if it res-
pects the principle of separation of powers and the judges pay attention about the 
possible economic consequences of their decisions. In economic issues the priori-
ties change from time to time, and this may also require changes in the economic 
policies, if the Constitutional Court ties the hands of the policy-makers will make 
it difficult to adjust policies to meet changing conditions. It is obviously that the 
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Congress and the Government have been inefficient in their constitutional roles of 
enforce rights, such as the right to health, however, the question is: legislative and 
executive inefficient justify Constitutional Court activism? 
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